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Abstract: This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a stochastic economy with
imperfectly competitive product markets and a discretionary government. We find that, in
the flexible price economy, optimal time-consistent policy implements the Friedman rule in-
dependently of the degree of imperfect competition. This result is in contrast to the Ramsey
literature, where the Friedman rule emerges as the optimal policy only if markets are perfectly
competitive. Second, once nominal rigidities are introduced, the Friedman rule ceases to be
optimal, inflation rates are low and stable, and tax rates are relatively volatile. Finally, optimal
time-consistent policy under sticky prices does not generate the near-random walk behavior of
taxes and real debt that can be observed under optimal policy in the Ramsey problem. A com-
mon reason for these results is that the discretionary government, in an effort to asymptotically
eliminate its time-consistency problem, accumulates a large net asset position such that it can
finance its expenditures via the associated interest earnings.
Keywords: Optimal macroeconomic policy, time-consistency, business cycles, Markov-perfect
equilibrium
JEL classification: E31, E32, E61, E63
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1 Introduction
The cyclical properties as well as the long-run implications of optimal macroeconomic poli-
cies have been studied extensively under the assumption that the government has commitment
power (the so-called Ramsey problem).1 The literature that analyzes optimal policies in the
absence of a commitment technology, however, is much less developed, and most authors have
focused on the long-run properties of optimal policies in relatively simple economies. In partic-
ular, attention has largely been restricted to deterministic settings so that our understanding
of the cyclical properties of optimal discretionary policy in the presence of macroeconomic
shocks is still very limited. In the present paper, we try to address this gap in the literature
by analyzing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of an economy with imperfectly
competitive product markets and a benevolent government that conducts both monetary and
fiscal policy but lacks commitment power. We characterize the equilibrium both under flexible
prices and under sticky prices.
The framework we employ for our analysis is the stochastic production economy developed by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a, 2004b). In this economy, product markets are imperfectly
competitive and productivity shocks and government spending shocks are the driving forces be-
hind macroeconomic fluctuations. Following the classical public finance literature, we assume
that the government is benevolent and uses monetary and fiscal policy instruments in order
to finance an exogenously given stream of public expenditures. This is a non-trivial problem,
because the government does not have access to non-distortionary instruments: income taxes
reduce the households’ incentives to supply labor, whereas positive nominal interest rates gen-
erate non-zero opportunity costs of holding money. Moreover, by allowing the government to
accumulate debt or assets, it can shift these distortions over time. The government’s net asset
position can therefore play an important role in absorbing macroeconomic shocks.
We have chosen the model from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a, 2004b) for our investiga-
tion, because it constitutes a relatively detailed, yet tractable framework, which has several
features that are deemed to be important for business cycle analysis. First, the model incorpo-
rates monopolistic competition and, therefore, allows for positive profits in the economy. This
provides scope for inflation as an indirect tax on monopoly rents. Furthermore, the economy
features nominal rigidities which are introduced via quadratic price adjustment costs. Al-
though this modelling approach implies that inflation causes resource costs, it avoids relative
price distortions which facilitates the numerical computation of equilibria. Finally, monetary
non-neutrality is generated via a transaction cost motive for holding money. This turns out
to be attractive from a computational perspective because, unlike the use of cash-in-advance
constraints, it does not give rise to occasionally binding constraints in a stochastic economy.
The second motive behind our choice of the particular model described above is to facilitate
the comparison of our results for discretionary policy with those derived by Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2004a, 2004b) for the Ramsey problem. We treat the latter as a benchmark against
which we assess the qualitative and quantitative implications of our alternative assumption
regarding the government’s intertemporal commitment capacity.
Under our maintained assumption of no commitment, the optimal policy problem is best de-
1See, e.g., the recent papers by Siu (2004), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a, 2004b), and Chugh (2007).
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scribed as a dynamic game between successive governments (sequential policy making). Fol-
lowing the pre-dominant approach of modern macroeconomics, we rule out reputational mecha-
nisms and restrict the analysis to Markov-perfect equilibria of this game. Hence, policy choices
may depend on history only via a set of endogenous and exogenous payoff-relevant state vari-
ables. In our setting, it turns out that the real level of public liabilities is the only endogenous
payoff-relevant state variable, whereas the levels of productivity and government expenditure
are the exogenous ones. By definition of a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the corresponding policy
rules are time-consistent, i.e., a sequential policy maker will never find it optimal to deviate
from these rules as time goes by. In contrast, optimal policies chosen by a government in the
Ramsey problem are generically dynamically inconsistent. This distinction between Ramsey
and Markov-perfect policies is particularly important in economic environments featuring an
endogenous state variable because, in the absence of commitment, the current policy maker
seeks to manipulate the future state of the economy such as to influence future policy choices.
As has been pointed out above, the economy under consideration is an example of such an
environment.2
A first key insight of our analysis is that, for the model under consideration, the steady state
corresponding to a Markov-perfect equilibrium is (at least locally) unique and asymptotically
stable. This is not true for the corresponding equilibrium of the Ramsey problem, which features
a continuum of neutrally stable steady states and where the initial conditions determine which
of these steady states is approached in the long-run. The steady state that emerges as the
Markov-perfect equilibrium outcome has the property that the commitment problem faced
by the policy maker disappears. In particular, we find that the discretionary government
accumulates a large net asset position in order to finance its outlays via the associated interest
earnings. In this respect, our paper relates to the results in Aiyagari et al. (2002). However,
whereas the mechanism stressed by Aiyagari et al. (2002) is the precautionary savings motive
of a Ramsey planner in a world of incomplete markets, in our case it is the sequential planner’s
intertemporal commitment problem which provides incentives to manipulate the endogenous
state variable.
Our central findings for the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation can be described as follows.
Under flexible prices and irrespective of the degree of monopolistic competition, the Friedman
rule is optimal and income taxes are perfectly smooth. This is in sharp contrast to the results
derived by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) for the corresponding Ramsey problem, according
to which the Friedman rule emerges only under perfect competition. The intuition behind our
finding is that, as stated above, the policy maker accumulates a large stock of assets which
allows him to finance expenditures and to subsidize labor effort via interest income. As after-
tax wages are equated to the marginal product of labor, output is at the competitive level
and the distortions due to monopolistic competition are eliminated. As a consequence, the
policy maker’s incentive to set positive interest rates disappears. In addition, inflationary
2As has been emphasized by Klein et al. (2007) in a similar environment, the motive for manipulation is an
indirect one in the following sense. Given the value of the future state variables, there is no disagreement with
respect to future policies between the current and the future government. However, the current government has
an incentive to alter the private sector’s expectations about future policies. This is achieved via the effect of
current policies on intertemporal decisions taken by private agents (such as the purchase of government debt).
These decisions, in turn, have an influence on future policies and, hence, on current expectations.
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revaluations of the government’s assets serve as the only shock absorber such that optimal tax
rates are perfectly smooth.
Under sticky prices, the Friedman rule is no longer optimal. Moreover, we find that the volatil-
ities of optimal taxes and inflation under discretion are similar to those under commitment.
Both of these findings can be explained by the trade-off that the government faces in economies
with imperfect competition and sticky prices. On the one hand, inflation is a powerful instru-
ment which makes the real returns to nominal government debt state-contingent and also serves
as a tax on monopoly rents. On the other hand, deviations from zero inflation are costly due
to the price adjustment costs faced by firms. For reasons familiar from the Ramsey literature
(Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004b; Siu, 2004), this trade-off between volatile and stable inflation
rates is largely resolved in favor of stable (and low) inflation.
Finally, we observe that the same mechanism that generates a locally unique and stable steady
state in a Markov-perfect equilibrium is also responsible for another important difference be-
tween optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. This difference concerns the
time-series properties of optimal tax rates and debt. More specifically, in the Markov-perfect
equilibrium considered in the present paper, taxes and debt under sticky prices do not dis-
play the near-random walk behavior that characterizes these variables in the Ramsey problem.
Thus, temporary shocks to technology or government expenditure do not have permanent ef-
fects on the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation. The explanation for this result is that the
sequential policy maker always manipulates the endogenous state variable in such a way that
the economy returns to the locally unique and stable steady state in the long-run.
The present paper contributes to a growing literature in macroeconomics that explores the
properties of optimal policies under discretion. For example, in a recent paper, Dı´az-Gime´nez
et al. (2008) study optimal time-consistent fiscal and monetary policies in a deterministic setting
with flexible prices and perfectly competitive markets. They point out the difficulty of credibly
implementing non-inflationary policies in economies with outstanding nominal public debt, as
governments are tempted to inflate in order to reduce the real value of their liabilities. In a
similar environment, Martin (2007) provides a positive theory of government debt. He shows
that the long-run level of debt is determined such that the sequential policy maker does not face
incentives to employ the inflation tax. In particular, the sign and the size of the steady state
level of government debt is determined by the relative ease/difficulty for households to substitute
away from goods subject to the inflation tax. Moreover, time-consistent policies have also been
studied extensively in the context of optimal taxation and fiscal policy. Recent contributions
include Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003), Klein et al. (2005), Klein et al. (2007), Ortigueira (2006),
and Ortigueira and Pereira (2007). However, all these papers are predominantly concerned
with the characterization and computation of Markov-perfect optimal policies in deterministic
environments. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first one that characterizes
the cyclical properties of monetary and fiscal policies in a stochastic economy governed by an
authority that lacks commitment power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model that we use for our
formal analysis. In Section 3 we define and characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policies,
as described by a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Section 4 presents the key quantitative results
about Markov-perfect equilibria and compares them to existing findings on Ramsey equilibria.
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Finally, Section 5 summarizes our results. Technical details and derivations are relegated to
the Supplementary Appendices at the very end of this document.
2 The model
For our subsequent analysis, we employ the model developed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004a, 2004b). As we have argued before, this model is a well-understood framework suitable
to address the type of questions we ask. Moreover, it constitutes an established benchmark for
the Ramsey literature against which we can compare our own results.
The model is an infinite-horizon production economy that features imperfectly competitive
product markets and sticky prices. A demand for money arises due to its role in facilitating
transactions. The government’s problem is to finance an exogenous stream of public expen-
ditures by levying distortionary taxes, printing money, and issuing nominally risk-free bonds.
Apart from the government (policy maker), who decides over both fiscal and monetary in-
struments, the economy is populated by a continuum of identical households who act both as
consumers and as producers. The following two subsections provide further details.
2.1 The private sector
Household i ∈ [0, 1] enters period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} holdingM it−1 units of money and Bit−1 units of
one-period bonds. The bonds are issued by the government and pay a nominal amount of Bit−1
when they mature at the beginning of period t. In addition, the household has two different
sources of income. First, it supplies hit units of labor to the producers in the economy, whereby
it takes the nominal wage Wt as given. Labor income is taxed at the rate τt such that the
household’s net income from supplying labor amounts to (1 − τt)Wthit. The second source of
income are profits from the production of intermediate goods. In particular, household i is the
monopolistic producer of the differentiated intermediate good i which is used as an input for
the production of the final good. As a producer, household i has access to the linear technology
yit = ath˜
i
t, where y
i
t is output of intermediate good i and at denotes the stochastic productivity.
The latter evolves according to
log at+1 = (1− ρa) log a¯+ ρa log at + εat+1, (1)
where a¯ is the steady state technology level, ρa measures its autocorrelation, and ε
a
t+1 ∼
N(0, σ2εa) denotes a technology innovation. Note that, while h
i
t is the household’s labor supply,
h˜it is the amount of labor it hires from a perfectly competitive market in order to produce
intermediate good i. The final good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of all intermediate goods,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
(yit)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
,
where yt denotes the quantity of the final good produced and θ measures the constant elasticity
of substitution between any two intermediate inputs. For an equilibrium to exist we assume
that θ > 1.
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Let P˜ it denote the price of intermediate good i charged by its monopolistic producer, and let
Pt denote the price of the final good. The demand for intermediate good i then depends on
aggregate demand and its relative price according to
dit = yt
(
P˜ it
Pt
)−θ
.
When setting its price, household i takes Pt and yt as given. As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004b), we allow for quadratic price adjustment costs a` la Rotemberg (1982). In real terms,
producer i faces the costs
PACit =
κ
2
(
P˜ it
P˜ it−1
− 1
)2
.
The parameter κ measures the importance of price adjustment costs. In particular, if κ = 0,
prices are flexible. Taking into account the price adjustment costs, the household’s profits from
producing good i are therefore given by
Πit =
P˜ it yt
(
P˜ it
Pt
)−θ
−Wth˜it −
κ
2
(
P˜ it
P˜ it−1
− 1
)2
Pt
 . (2)
The household’s income is used to finance consumption expenditures and savings. In particular,
household i consumes cit units of the final good in period t. When acquiring consumption goods,
the household has to pay a proportional transaction cost s(vit) that depends on the household’s
consumption-based money velocity, vit = Ptc
i
t/M
i
t . Thus, there is a transaction role for money.
The transaction cost function s is assumed to take non-negative values and to be twice con-
tinuously differentiable. Moreover, there exists a level of velocity v > 0 (the satiation level of
money) such that s(v) = s′(v) = 0 and (v − v)s′(v) > 0 for v 6= v. Finally, it is assumed that
2s′(v)+vs′′(v) > 0 holds for all v ≥ v. As discussed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b), these
assumptions imply that the Friedman rule need not be associated with an infinite demand for
money, that the transaction cost as well as the distortion it introduces vanish when the nominal
interest rate is equal to zero, and that, in equilibrium, the money velocity is always greater
than or equal to the satiation level. Furthermore, the demand for money is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate.
The household saves either in the form of money or government debt. Its nominal budget
constraint is thus given by
M it−1 +B
i
t−1 + (1− τt)Wthit +Πit ≥ Ptcit[1 + s(vit)] +M it +Bit/(1 +Rt),
where Rt is the net nominal interest rate on bonds issued in period t. In addition to the budget
constraint, the household is subject to a constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi
schemes.
Subject to these constraints, the household seeks to maximize its expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cit, h
i
t), (3)
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where u denotes the household’s instantaneous utility function and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes a time
discount factor. E0 is the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information
available in period 0. We assume that the function u satisfies standard properties.
2.2 The government
The government controls monetary and fiscal policies. It faces expenditures gt, which are
exogenous, stochastic, and unproductive. In particular, gt evolves according to
log gt+1 = (1− ρg) log g¯ + ρg log gt + εgt+1, (4)
where g¯ denotes the steady state government expenditures, ρg is the autocorrelation coefficient,
and εgt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2εg). To finance its expenditures, the government collects labor income taxes
at rate τt, issues government bonds Bt, and receives seignorage income. Bonds issued in period
t are nominally risk-free and promise to pay Bt units of currency when they mature in period
t + 1. Monetary policy manages the supply of money Mt and sets nominal interest rates Rt.
The consolidated government budget constraint in nominal terms is thus given by
τtWtht + (Mt −Mt−1) +Bt/(1 +Rt) ≥ Ptgt +Bt−1.
The policy instruments τt, Bt, Rt, and Mt are chosen in such a way that this constraint holds
and the lifetime utility of the representative household given in (3) is maximized.
3 Equilibrium
Since we are interested in characterizing optimal policy by a government without commitment
power, we assume that the government actually consists of an infinite sequence of separate
policy makers, one for each period. The policy maker who is in charge in period t will be
referred to as the period-t government. This government seeks to maximize social welfare from
period t onwards, whereby it takes the behavior of its later incarnations as given. In other
words, we consider a Nash equilibrium in the game among all period-t governments, where t
ranges from 0 to +∞.
We restrict our analysis to Markov-perfect equilibria, in which the policy choices in period
t do not depend on the entire history up to period t but only on payoff-relevant state vari-
ables. In other words, we assume that reputational mechanisms are not at work. Letting
bt−1 = Bt−1/Pt−1 and mt−1 = Mt−1/Pt−1 denote the real values of government debt and money,
respectively, the amount of real government liabilities is given by `t−1 = mt−1 + bt−1. The
variable `t−1 turns out to be the only endogenous aggregate state variable relevant for decisions
taken in period t. In addition, there will be two exogenous state variables, namely, productivity
at and government expenditure gt.
In order to define a Markov-perfect equilibrium, we follow the three-step approach outlined in
Klein et al. (2005). First, we define the private sector equilibrium under the assumption that a
single but arbitrarily given policy rule determines government behavior from the present into
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the infinite future. In the second step, we define optimal policy for the period-t government,
when the behavior of all future governments is determined by a single but arbitrarily given
rule. Finally, we define a Markov-perfect equilibrium (optimal time-consistent policy rule) as a
policy rule that is optimal for the period-t government provided that the period-t government
expects all future governments to also choose this rule (policy fixed point).
3.1 Private sector equilibrium for an arbitrary policy rule
For notational convenience, let us denote the endogenous aggregate state variable that is rele-
vant for period-t decisions by st, that is, st = `t−1. Analogously, let us collect the two exogenous
state variables in the vector zt = (at, gt). For the time being, we assume that both the current
and all future governments use the (arbitrary) policy rule Ω to map the aggregate state vari-
ables into their instrument variables. Since the vector of instruments implemented in period t
is given by (τt, bt, Rt,mt), we thus assume that (τt′ , bt′ , Rt′ ,mt′) = Ω(st′ , zt′) holds for all t
′ ≥ t.
In the present subsection, we determine symmetric private sector equilibria induced by this
policy rule. Note that we implicitly assume the policy rule to be anonymous. Accordingly, Ω
does not condition on the distribution of individual states sit to be defined next.
The individual state vector sit of household i includes its beginning-of-period real wealth, `
i
t−1 =
Bit−1/Pt−1 +M
i
t−1/Pt−1, and the relative price p
i
t−1 = P˜
i
t−1/Pt−1 the household has charged as
a producer of intermediate good i in the previous period. Formally, sit = (`
i
t−1, p
i
t−1). The
household takes the real wage rate wt = Wt/Pt, the inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1, and the output
quantity of the final good yt as given. In particular, it perceives these variables to be functions
of the aggregate state of the economy, given the policies Ω. Formally, (wt, pit, yt) = F(st, zt; Ω).
We can now formulate the household’s problem recursively as follows:
V (sit, st, zt; Ω) = max
mit, b
i
t, c
i
t, h
i
t, h˜
i
t, p
i
t
{
u(cit, h
i
t) + βEtV (s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
}
(5)
subject to
cit
[
1 + s
(
cit
mit
)]
+mit +
bit
1 +Rt
≤ `
i
t−1
pit
+ (1− τt)wthit + (pit)1−θyt − wth˜it −
κ
2
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)2
,
(6)(
pit
)−θ
yt ≤ ath˜it, (7)
`it = m
i
t + b
i
t, (8)
log at+1 = (1− ρa) log a¯+ ρa log(at) + εat+1,
log gt+1 = (1− ρg) log g¯ + ρg log(gt) + εgt+1,
wt = Fw(st, zt; Ω),
pit = Fpi(st, zt; Ω),
yt = Fy(st, zt; Ω),
τt = Ωτ (st, zt),
bt = Ωb(st, zt),
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Rt = ΩR(st, zt),
mt = Ωm(st, zt).
Let λit denote the multiplier on household i’s flow budget constraint (6). The solution to
the household’s problem is given by decision rules which, given the policy rule Ω, map the
individual and aggregate state variables into decisions formit, b
i
t, c
i
t, h
i
t, h˜
i
t, p
i
t, and the multiplier
λit, respectively. Formally:
cit = fc(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
hit = fh(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
h˜it = fh˜(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
mit = fm(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
bit = fb(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
pit = fp(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω),
λit = fλ(s
i
t, st, zt; Ω).
Let us collect these decision rules in a vector-valued function f . The elements of f are charac-
terized by the constraints (6), (7), and (8) holding with equality and the following first-order
conditions:3
0 = βEt
λit+1
pit+1
− λit[1− (vit)2s′(vit)],
0 = βEt
λit+1
pit+1
− λ
i
t
1 +Rt
,
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂cit
− λit[1 + s(vit) + vts′(vit)],
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂hit
+ λit(1− τt)wt,
0 = −λitwt +mctλitat,
0 = λit(1− θ)(pit)−θyt − λtκ
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)
pit
pit−1
+mctλ
i
tθ(p
i
t)
−θ−1yt
+ βκEtλ
i
t+1
(
pit+1pit+1
pit
− 1
)
pit+1pit+1
(pit)
2
.
Finally, note that the equilibrium decision rules must also be consistent with the respective
no-Ponzi and transversality conditions.
Having outlined the household’s optimization problem for given policies Ω, we proceed to
define the private sector equilibrium (again for given policies Ω). As hinted above, we restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria in which initial bond and money holdings are identical and
all households make identical choices. In particular, since there is a continuum of measure one
3Supplementary Appendix B provides a formal derivation of these conditions. Note that, for notational
convenience, we present the first-order conditions in terms of allocations instead of the decision rules f .
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of households, this implies that individual variables correspond to economy-wide aggregates,
i.e., households are representative.
For the purpose of the formal definition of equilibrium, we introduce some more notation. First,
let us introduce the vector-valued function F with the following components:
Fc(st, zt; Ω) = fc((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fh(st, zt; Ω) = fh((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fh˜(st, zt; Ω) = fh˜((mt−1, bt−1, 1)
′, st, zt; Ω),
Fm(st, zt; Ω) = fm((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fb(st, zt; Ω) = fb((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fp(st, zt; Ω) = fp((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fy(st, zt; Ω) = atfh((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω),
Fλ(st, zt; Ω) = fλ((mt−1, bt−1, 1)′, st, zt; Ω).
Note that the vector-valued function F defined in this way describes economy-wide aggregates
of the respective variables, presuming that households are identical. Finally, let us introduce the
functions Fw(st, zt; Ω), Fpi(st, zt; Ω), and Fy(st, zt; Ω), which denote the actual wage and inflation
rates as well as the level of aggregate demand that are consistent with optimal household
behavior in the symmetric equilibrium.
We are now ready to define a private sector equilibrium for a given policy rule Ω.
Definition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium given policy rule Ω consists of a household
value function V (·, ·, ·; Ω), household decision rules f(·, ·, ·; Ω), and a perceived function F(·, ·; Ω)
such that:
(i) Households optimize, i.e., given states (sit, st, zt), policies Ω, and the perceived function
F(·, ·; Ω), the value function V (·, ·, ·; Ω) and the decision rules f(·, ·, ·; Ω) solve the house-
hold’s problem.
(ii) Households are representative, i.e., `it−1 = `t−1 and p
i
t = 1 holds for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}.
(iii) Households are rational, i.e., the perceived equations for the real wage, the inflation rate,
and aggregate output coincide with their respective actual equations:
Fw(st, zt; Ω) = Fw(st, zt; Ω),
Fpi(st, zt; Ω) = Fpi(st, zt; Ω),
Fy(st, zt; Ω) = Fy(st, zt; Ω).
(iv) Markets clear:
Fh(st, zt; Ω) = Fh˜(st, zt; Ω),
Fm(st, zt; Ω) = Ωm(st, zt),
Fb(st, zt; Ω) = Ωb(st, zt),
Fy(st, zt; Ω) = Fc(st, zt; Ω)
[
1 + s
(
Fc(st, zt; Ω)
Fm(st, zt; Ω)
)]
+ gt +
κ
2
(Fpi(st, zt; Ω)− 1)2 .
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(v) The policy rule Ω is feasible, i.e., it satisfies
Ωτ (st, zt)Fw(st, zt; Ω)Fh(st, zt; Ω) + Ωm(st, zt) +
Ωb(st, zt)
1 + ΩR(st, zt)
= gt +
`t−1
Fpi(st, zt; Ω)
Having defined the private sector equilibrium for given policies Ω, we finally proceed to char-
acterize the policy maker’s value function (given Ω). Specifically, the policy maker’s value
function is implicitly given by
W (st, zt; Ω) = u(Fc(st, zt; Ω), Fh(st, zt; Ω)) + βEtW (S(st, zt; Ω), zt+1; Ω),
where S(st, zt; Ω) = Fm(st, zt; Ω) + Fb(st, zt; Ω).
3.2 Optimal current policy rule for given future policy rule
In the previous subsection, we have outlined the household’s problem when both current and
future policies are characterized by Ω. Furthermore, we have characterized the (symmetric)
private sector equilibrium decision rules associated with this problem. In this subsection, we
consider the household’s problem, assuming that it faces a current policy rule which potentially
differs from the rule employed in the future. More specifically, the household presumes that
current policies are described by Ωˆ and that, from the next period onwards, policies are deter-
mined by the rule Ω. Again, we first outline the household’s problem and the private sector
equilibrium. Then, we characterize Ωˆ, the optimal current macroeconomic policy rule from the
perspective of a policy maker who faces the future policy rule Ω. We follow the notational
convention in Klein et al. (2005) and mark by hats all those functions that are affected by the
current policy.
The problem of a household facing a current policy rule Ωˆ followed by a future policy rule Ω
can be formulated in a recursive way as follows.
Vˆ (sit, st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω) = max
mit, b
i
t, c
i
t, h
i
t, h˜
i
t, p
i
t
{
u(cit, h
i
t) + EtβV (s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
}
(9)
subject to
cit
[
1 + s
(
cit
mit
)]
+mit +
bit
1 +Rt
≤ `
i
t−1
pit
+ (1− τt)wthit + (pit)1−θyt − wth˜it −
κ
2
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)2
,
(10)(
pit
)−θ
yt ≤ ath˜it, (11)
`it = m
i
t + b
i
t, (12)
log at+1 = (1− ρa) log a¯+ ρa log(at) + εat+1,
log gt+1 = (1− ρg) log g¯ + ρg log(gt) + εgt+1,
wt = Fˆw(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω),
pit = Fˆpi(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω),
yt = Fˆy(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω),
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τt = Ωˆτ (st, zt),
bt = Ωˆb(st, zt),
Rt = ΩˆR(st, zt),
mt = Ωˆm(st, zt),
where Fˆ(·, ·; Ωˆ,Ω) describes the perceived evolution of wages, inflation, and aggregate output
conditional on policies being Ωˆ followed by Ω. Note also that the function V appearing on the
right-hand side of (9) is the solution of the problem of maximizing (5) subject to the relevant
constraints.
The solution to problem (9) is given by two sets of decision rules, one for the current period,
fˆ(·, ·, ·; Ωˆ,Ω), and one for the future, f(·, ·, ·; Ω). The future decision rules are those that we
have derived in the previous section. The current rules, on the other hand, are characterized by
the constraints (10), (11), and (12) holding with equality together with the following first-order
conditions:
0 = βEt
fλ(s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
Fpi(st+1, zt+1; Ωˆ,Ω)
− λ
i
t
1 +Rt
,
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂cit
− λit[1 + s(vit) + vts′(vit)],
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂hit
+ λit(1− τt)wt,
0 = −λitwt +mctλitat,
0 = λit(1− θ)(pit)−θyt − λitκ
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)
pit
pit−1
+
wt
at
λitθ(p
i
t)
−1ath˜it + βκEtfλ(s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
×
(
fp(s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)Fpi(st+1, zt+1; Ωˆ,Ω)
pit
− 1
)
fp(s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)Fpi(st+1, zt+1; Ωˆ,Ω)
(pit)
2
.
Note that, when deciding about current variables, the household anticipates that future policy
decisions are governed by the rules Ω so that the household’s own decisions from period t +
1 onwards are generated by the future decision rules f(·, ·, ·; Ω). Again, in the symmetric
private sector equilibrium, households optimize and are representative such that private sector
behavior can be characterized by aggregate decision rules Fˆ (·, ·; Ωˆ,Ω) for the current period t
and F (·, ·; Ω) from period t+ 1 onwards.
Finally, let us characterize the policy maker’s problem of choosing optimal current policies when
facing a continuation policy rule Ω. The current policy maker’s maximization problem is
Wˆ (st, zt; Ω) = max
τt, bt, Rt,mt
{
u
(
Fˆc(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω), Fˆh(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω)
)
+ βEtW (Sˆ(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω), zt+1; Ω)
}
subject to
τtFˆw(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω)Fˆh(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω) +mt +
bt
1 +Rt
≥ gt + `t−1
Fˆpi(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω)
,
where Sˆ(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω) = Fˆm(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω) + Fˆb(st, zt; Ωˆ,Ω) and where the function W satisfies (9).
The solution to the problem is given by the policy rule Ωˆ(st, zt; Ω).
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3.3 Policy fixed point
The results derived in the previous two subsections allow us to define the time-consistent policy
rules (Markov-perfect equilibrium) in the following way.
Definition 2 The policy rule Ω∗ defines an optimal time-consistent policy if it is the current
policy maker’s optimal policy when future policies are expected to be determined by Ω∗. Formally,
Ω∗(st, zt) = Ωˆ(st, zt; Ω∗).
4 Quantitative results
This section presents the quantitative results of our analysis. We start by briefly discussing the
numerical strategy for solving the model as well as the calibration. After that, we investigate
the long-run properties and business cycle characteristics of optimal time-consistent taxes and
inflation in a flexible price environment, and we compare them to the corresponding properties
in the Ramsey problem. We find both noteworthy similarities and differences. Finally, we
discuss the same issues for the economy with sticky prices.
4.1 Computation
In order to solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium policies, we could in principle follow the
theoretical approach laid out in Sections 3.1-3.3. In particular, we could apply a policy iteration
algorithm to determine the functional fixed point Ω∗. This is computationally demanding,
however, since, at each iteration step, we would have to solve the household’s optimization
problem to obtain private sector decision rules and the corresponding value functions. To
avoid the computational burden associated with such a procedure, we choose to solve for the
equilibrium following a primal approach. That is, we presume that the policy maker chooses
both the policy instruments and the resulting allocation subject to a set of feasibility and
implementability constraints. Feasibility requires that the policy maker’s budget constraint is
satisfied for each state and each period, whereas implementability requires that the allocation
satisfies the household’s optimality conditions. A formal description of the policy maker’s
problem in primal form is provided in Supplementary Appendix D.
To compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium numerically, we proceed as follows. We first com-
pute the (approximate) steady state of the model based on an iterative first-order accurate
perturbation method. Having identified the steady state, we define the relevant state space
as a symmetric interval around this point. We then employ this information in a Galerkin
projection method to compute third-order approximations to the equilibrium decision rules.
Finally, as a numerical accuracy check, we verify that the Euler equation errors associated with
simulated time series are sufficiently small. A detailed description of the numerical algorithm
is available in Supplementary Appendix E.
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4.2 Calibration
In our numerical analysis, we use the utility function
u(c, h) =
c1−ϑ − 1
1− ϑ + δh
(1− h)1−η − 1
1− η , (13)
where δh is the relative weight of leisure in the utility function, and where ϑ and η determine
the elasticities of intertemporal substitution in consumption and leisure, respectively. As for
the transaction cost function we assume that
s(vt) = Avt +B/vt − 2
√
AB, (14)
where A and B are positive parameters. The corresponding money demand function turns out
to be
mt = A
1/2ct [B +Rt/(1 +Rt)]
−1/2 ,
which implies that money demand is increasing in consumption and decreasing in the interest
rate. Also, note that money demand is well-defined even if Rt = 0.
To facilitate the comparison of our results to those in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b), we
adopt their parameterization as the benchmark calibration for our analysis. This requires in
particular that the parameters ϑ and η are both equal to 1 such that the utility function
is logarithmic in both arguments. Also for the remaining parameters of the model, we take
exactly the values employed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b) as summarized in Table 1.
Due to space constraints, we do not provide any justification for this parameterization or for the
choice of the transaction cost function (14), but refer the reader to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004b), where these issues are discussed. Note, however, that the benchmark calibration
features monopolistic markups of 20% and a degree of price stickiness consistent with a model
of staggered price setting where individual firms change their prices on average every nine
months.
Table 1: Benchmark calibration
β ϑ η δh θ κ ρa a¯ σa ρg g¯ σg A B
0.96 1 1 2.9 6 17.5/4 0.82 1 0.0229 0.9 0.04 0.0302 0.0111 0.07524
4.3 Results for the flexible price economy
Recall that the literature on optimal policies under commitment has delivered two key insights
for flexible price economies; see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a, 2004b). First, if markets
are perfectly competitive, then optimal policy implements the Friedman rule of setting the net
nominal interest rate equal to zero. The planner finds it optimal to use surprise inflation to make
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the returns to nominal debt state-contingent, which allows for relatively smooth taxes over the
business cycle. Consequently, inflation is on average negative, displays little serial correlation,
and a relatively high degree of volatility. Secondly, the Friedman rule ceases to be optimal
if markets are not perfectly competitive because positive nominal interest rates serve as an
indirect tax on monopoly profits. Since monopoly rights are inelastic factors in production, the
planner chooses to implement non-zero interest rates to allow for a less distortionary sequence
of labor taxes. To summarize, the relevant literature on the Ramsey problem suggest that the
degree of market power that exists in product markets has a decisive influence on the optimality
of the Friedman rule. In this subsection we analyze whether these findings carry over to the
case of a sequential policy maker.
In order to study a flexible price environment we eliminate the price adjustment costs, that is,
we set κ = 0. In what follows, we first present some analytical results on the steady state that
obtains in the non-stochastic version of the flexible price economy governed by a sequential
policy maker. We call this steady state the Markovian steady state. After that, we present
numerical results on the dynamic properties of optimal discretionary policies.4
Proposition 1 If κ = 0, there exists a non-stochastic Markovian steady state characterized by
a = a¯,
g = g¯,
R = 0,
τ = 1− θ
θ − 1 ,
pi = β,
w =
θ − 1
θ
a,
v =
√
B
A
= v,
δha
η−1cϑ = (a− c− g)η,
m = c/v,
h = (c+ g)/a,
y = ah,
` =
(
1− 1
β
)−1
[g − τwh],
b = `−m,
λ = c−ϑ.
4We have to emphasize the following caveat regarding the Markovian steady state. It is well known that
uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibria can hardly ever be established for reasonably complex models. We
conjecture that this is true also for our model. Consequently, since we do not formally prove uniqueness of the
Markov-perfect equilibrium, we cannot formally establish global uniqueness of the implied steady state either.
Our further analysis proceeds subject to this caveat.
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For ϑ = η = 1, steady state consumption and labor effort can be derived explicitly as
c =
a− g
1 + δh
, h =
a+ δhg
a(1 + δh)
.
Proof: The proof is available in Supplementary Appendix F. 
Proposition 1 illustrates that, in the long-run, the sequential policy maker accumulates a suffi-
ciently large net asset position vis-a`-vis the private sector to finance both government spending
and a subsidy to labor effort via the real return on bonds. This means that the sequential
planner manipulates the endogenous state variable such as to eliminate the distortions in the
economy. Hence, in the long-run, the aggregate resource constraint is the only restriction that
binds the planner, which is evidenced by the fact that all multipliers on the planner’s im-
plementability constraints except for the one that corresponds to the resource constraint are
zero.5
This is achieved via sequential policy choices, which facilitate the steady state net nominal in-
terest rate to be set equal to zero – the Friedman rule. Hence, the consumption-based velocity
of money is at its satiation level and the wedge between the marginal utilities of consumption
and wealth present due to transaction costs is removed (s(v) = s′(v) = 0). Furthermore, as
long as θ < ∞, the policy maker implements a negative labor tax rate such as to counteract
the inefficiently low labor supply due to the imperfectly competitive market structure. That
is, labor effort is subsidized to a point where the after tax real wage is equated to the mar-
ginal product of labor. Consequently, steady state output is at the competitive level and the
consumption allocation does not depend on the degree of monopoly distortions θ.
In order to find out whether the optimal time-consistent policy implements the Friedman rule
also out of the steady state, we simulate the model. Table 2 displays the cyclical properties
of key macroeconomic variables, computed as the averages of J = 500 simulations of length
T = 100. Results for taxes τ , inflation pi, and the nominal interest rate R are reported in
percentage points, whereas the remaining variables are reported in levels. For both perfectly
and imperfectly competitive environments, our simulations confirm that sequentially optimal
monetary policy indeed follows the Friedman rule. Actually, irrespective of the degree of mo-
nopolistic competition, nominal interest rates are equal to zero not only on average, but in all
states over the business cycle. This is in contrast to the findings for optimal Ramsey policies
reported in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a), where average nominal interest rates are shown
to increase along with the (gross) monopolistic markup θ/(θ − 1).6
This difference is to be understood as follows. In the imperfectly competitive economy, the
policy maker does not have an instrument to directly tax the monopoly rents accruing to
producers. Hence, as an indirect way to tax profit income, the Ramsey planner resorts to
the inflation tax which distorts nominal interest rates away from zero.7 However, this result
5See Supplementary Appendices D and F.
6Table 2 presents results only for the case of perfect competition (θ = ∞) and the case of a 20% markup
(θ = 6). Further simulations for alternative markups yield results which are very similar to the latter case.
7Inflation acts as an indirect tax on profits because consumers must hold money in order to transform profits
into consumption.
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Table 2: Dynamic properties of the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation under flexible prices
Variable Mean Std. dev. Auto. Corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,a)
Flexible prices and perfect competition (κ = 0 and θ =∞)
τ 0 0 - - - -
pi -3.8103 2.1357 -0.0808 -0.2951 -0.1705 -0.2681
R 0 0 - - - -
y 0.2866 0.0096 0.7766 1.0000 0.1816 0.9814
h 0.2861 0.0021 0.8346 -0.3436 0.8467 -0.5097
c 0.2466 0.0095 0.7743 0.9663 -0.0636 0.9977
b -1.0991 0.0389 0.7834 -0.9855 -0.3374 -0.9349
m 0.0947 0.0036 0.7743 0.9663 -0.0636 0.9977
` -1.0043 0.0356 0.7857 -0.9773 -0.3754 -0.9191
Flexible prices and imperfect competition (κ = 0 and θ = 6)
τ -20 0 - - - -
pi -3.8149 2.2118 -0.0896 -0.3196 -0.0825 -0.3097
R 0 0 - - - -
y 0.2866 0.0096 0.7766 1.0000 0.1816 0.9814
h 0.2861 0.0021 0.8346 -0.3436 0.8467 -0.5097
c 0.2466 0.0095 0.7743 0.9663 -0.0636 0.9977
b -2.2939 0.0823 0.7758 -0.9996 -0.1553 -0.9864
m 0.0947 0.0036 0.7743 0.9663 -0.0636 0.9977
` -2.1992 0.0788 0.7761 -0.9998 -0.1653 -0.9846
The parameters are: β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9, ρa = 0.82, a¯ = 1, σa = 0.0229,
ρg = 0.9, g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302, A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524, J = 500, T = 100.
needs to be qualified in that a Ramsey planner operating at a steady state with a large net asset
position against the private sector would implement a different policy. Specifically, if the interest
earnings on assets are sufficient to finance public spending and the subsidy needed to correct
the productive inefficiency due to monopolistic competition, then the policy maker implements
zero nominal interest rates no matter whether there is commitment (Ramsey planner) or not
(sequential planner).8 For the Ramsey planner, though, there is no mechanism which determines
the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio independently of the initial conditions. Hence, as Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) correctly point out, their simulation results are conditional on the
initial level of government liabilities. Conversely, starting from any initial asset position, the
sequential planner accumulates assets until a non-distorted allocation can be implemented.
Besides this key difference between the nominal interest rates implemented by generic Ramsey
versus Markov-perfect policies, we can report a number of further characteristics of optimal
discretionary policies under flexible prices. As hinted above, average tax rates are non-positive
and vary inversely with the gross markup θ/(θ−1). More importantly, their standard deviation
of zero indicates that not only nominal interest rates, but also the tax rates on labor are
8Table 6 in Appendix A provides results for the dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation evaluated at
the Markovian steady state. Note that our numerical algorithm to compute Ramsey allocations is virtually
identical to the algorithm employed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b) and draws largely on computer code
developed by these authors.
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perfectly smooth. This implies that inflation serves as the main shock absorber, which works
as a state-contingent lump-sum tax on households’ financial wealth.9 Indeed, while the volatility
of inflation around the Markovian steady state is significantly lower than the one implied by
the Ramsey allocation in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a, 2004b), with a standard deviation
of 2.21% it is still by far the most volatile variable in our economy. The serial correlation of
inflation rates is close to zero which, in turn, suggests that the inflation tax is mainly used in
response to unanticipated changes in the aggregate state of the economy.
4.4 Results for the sticky price economy
We now turn to the discussion of optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policies under
sticky prices. In an environment of sticky prices and nominal non-state contingent debt, the
policy maker faces a trade-off in choosing the optimal path of inflation. On the one hand,
unexpected inflation serves as a non-distortionary tax on nominal wealth and helps to minimize
tax distortions over the business cycle. On the other hand, deviations from zero in the rate of
inflation are costly due to the price adjustment costs faced by firms. In this context, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b) and Siu (2004) obtain two key results. First, they establish that,
in the presence of nominal rigidities, the above trade-off is largely resolved in favor of price
stability. Accordingly, the Ramsey planner chooses inflation rates that are close to zero at
all dates and all states. Second, they argue that sticky prices introduce a near-random walk
behavior of taxes and public debt. In what follows, we analyze whether these two results carry
over to the sequential policy maker.
4.4.1 Optimal volatility of taxes and inflation
In analogy to what happens in the Ramsey problem, the Friedman rule ceases to be optimal
also for the sequential policy maker once we allow for sticky prices. This holds despite the
fact that the Markovian steady state involves a large net asset position (the debt-to-GDP ratio
is at −8.02), which should help to minimize the need for distortionary taxes. However, when
facing the trade-off underlying the choice of optimal inflation rates, the sequential planner still
overwhelmingly opts for price stability. Table 3 illustrates this finding and further corroborates
the view that the cyclical properties of optimal policies are remarkably robust to variations
in the policy maker’s intertemporal commitment capability, provided that the Ramsey policies
are evaluated at the Markovian steady state.10 This suggests that, in the neighborhood of
this steady state, the lack of intertemporal commitment is not a binding restriction for a
sequential planner. Indeed, optimal inflation rates are on average close to zero and display
very little variation, irrespective of whether the policy maker has access to commitment or not.
More precisely, annual inflation rates implemented by a sequential planner fall in a tight band
between roughly −0.5% and 0.1%. On the other hand, with a standard deviation of 2.79% the
labor tax rate is relatively volatile, ranging from approximately −12% to −28%. The intuition
behind these results is the same as for the Ramsey policy maker. When price changes are costly,
9Compare Chari et al. (1991).
10Again, see Table 6 in Appendix A.
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the policy maker chooses a low and stable inflation rate, which comes at the cost of relatively
volatile labor income taxes.
Table 3: Dynamic properties of the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation under sticky prices
Variable Mean Std. dev. Auto. Corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,a)
τ -20.0408 2.7859 0.4582 0.5046 0.1145 0.8270
pi -0.2051 0.1177 0.4419 -0.4742 -0.1317 -0.8042
R 3.7780 0.5108 0.4572 -0.2794 0.2525 0.1057
y 0.2844 0.0063 0.9349 1.0000 0.1838 0.8733
h 0.2841 0.0057 0.5214 -0.4928 0.2079 -0.8508
c 0.2441 0.0063 0.9190 0.9208 -0.1886 0.8687
b -2.2810 0.0482 0.9241 -0.9965 -0.2139 -0.8977
m 0.0770 0.0030 0.7962 0.7515 -0.2587 0.5051
` -2.2039 0.0461 0.9161 -0.9917 -0.2410 -0.9049
The parameters are: β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9, θ = 6, κ = 17.5/4, ρa = 0.82,
a¯ = 1, σa = 0.0229, ρg = 0.9, g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302, A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524,
J = 500, T = 100.
To further illustrate the sequential policy maker’s trade-off between inflation and tax volatility
in the presence of price adjustment costs, Figure 1 displays the volatility of both policy instru-
ments as a function of the parameter κ. As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b), we find that
optimal policy stabilizes inflation already for relatively low levels of price stickiness. Further-
more, as κ grows, the optimal volatility of inflation approaches zero, whereas the volatility of
taxes is increasing in κ. In light of these results, we conclude that the volatilities of taxes and
inflation implemented by a sequential policy maker under sticky prices are virtually identical
to the respective volatilities implemented by a Ramsey planner.
Figure 1: Effects of price stickiness on inflation and tax volatility
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A final observation relates to the serial correlation properties of inflation. In contrast to our
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findings for the flexible price environment, where inflation displayed only little persistence at a
serial correlation of −0.09, with sticky prices the serial correlation of inflation is considerable
at 0.44. The intuition for this finding is that the government’s large net asset position at the
Markovian steady state facilitates the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies which
allow a high degree of consumption smoothing. Indeed, the consumption allocation in the
Markov-perfect equilibrium is characterized by little volatility and high persistence. As a
consequence, also the real interest rate displays substantial persistence. In conjunction with
price rigidity, which implies that optimal nominal interest rates are not too volatile, this calls
for persistent inflation via the Fisher relationship.11
4.4.2 Dynamic properties of taxes and public debt
Price volatility is a way of introducing state-contingency in the real returns on nominal gov-
ernment debt. Under flexible prices the government can use changes in the price level as a
non-distortionary tax or transfer on private asset positions. So, nominal non-state-contingent
debt becomes state-contingent in real terms. Indeed, Chari et al. (1991) demonstrate that the
Ramsey allocation in a flexible price economy with nominally non-state-contingent debt behaves
exactly like that of an economy with real state-contingent debt. Seen from this perspective,
introducing price adjustment costs works as if the government was limited in its ability to
issue real state-contingent debt. This is reflected in the finding of the Ramsey literature that
the presence of price adjustment costs implies a pronounced drop in the optimal volatility of
inflation. Our results above indicate that this property carries over to the case of optimal
time-consistent policies.
In the following, we therefore investigate for the sticky price economy whether taxes and public
debt implemented by the sequential policy maker also display the near-random walk behavior
that characterizes optimal Ramsey policies. To address this question, we analyze the econ-
omy’s reaction to an uncorrelated government spending shock. More precisely, we study the
implications of a one-standard deviation shock to government spending on public debt/wealth,
labor taxes/subsidies, nominal interest rates, inflation, consumption, output, and real money
holdings.
The impulse responses drawn in Figure 2 reveal the following pattern. The existence of price
adjustment costs implies that the planner is reluctant to vary the inflation rate in response to
the unanticipated expenditure shock. However, the labor subsidy is increased, thus boosting
labor supply and output in order to absorb the increased public expenditure with a moderate
reduction in private consumption. To finance these policies, the government must reduce its
asset position. Hence, real public wealth decreases. Most importantly, however, the effects
on taxes and public wealth have some persistence, but are far from the near-random walk
behavior reported in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b) and Siu (2004). In other words, the
stochastic properties of the Markovian allocation fall in between the polar cases where taxes
and public debt either inherit the stochastic process of the underlying exogenous shock or
display a unit-root. The former case results under complete markets, i.e., in an economy with
real state-contingent debt or, equivalently, an economy with nominal non-state-contingent debt
11See Chugh (2007) for a discussion of this effect in an economy with capital and/or habit persistence.
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Figure 2: Impulse response to an uncorrelated government spending shock.
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Note: The size of the innovation in government spending is one standard deviation. Public wealth, consumption,
output, and real balances are measured in percent deviations from their pre-shock levels. The labor subsidy,
the nominal interest rate, and inflation are measured in percentage points. Government spending is measured
in levels.
and flexible prices (Lucas and Stokey, 1983). The latter case corresponds to an economy with
non-state-contingent debt in real terms or, equivalently, a sticky price economy with nominally
non-state-contingent debt (Aiyagari et al., 2002).
The reason behind the limited persistence appears to be the interplay between two forces. On
the one hand, the stability of optimal inflation under sticky prices implies that there is only
a minimal state-contingency of nominal debt in real terms. This generates the persistence in
the response of real debt levels to the purely transitory exogenous spending shock. On the
other hand, the model with a sequential policy maker features a model-inherent mechanism
that ensures convergence to the locally unique and asymptotically stable steady state. With
a Ramsey policy maker, the model lacks such a mechanism. Quite to the contrary, the latter
admits a continuum of steady states, each of which is associated with different values of the
initial state variables (s−1, z−1). Hence, in response to a spending shock the Ramsey economy
simply moves from one steady state to another, thus generating a unit root in taxes and
real debt. In the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the economy without commitment, however,
monetary and fiscal policies are dynamically adjusted such as to bring these variables to their
pre-shock (steady state) values over time. Paired with the sticky price effect, which prevents an
immediate adjustment via variations in the rate of inflation, the convergence to the Markovian
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steady state generates the dynamics observed in Figure 2.
4.4.3 The effects of market power
Our benchmark calibration underlying Table 3 features a demand elasticity θ consistent with
price markups over marginal costs of 20%. In order to assess the sensitivity of optimal time-
consistent policies to changes in the degree of market power, we now let the parameter θ
vary such as to induce markups of 10% and 30%, respectively. Inspection of Tables 3 and 4
demonstrates that average labor subsidies increase from 9.7% over 20.0% to 30.2% as monopoly
markups increase. As we have already hinted above, this reflects the government’s objective to
counteract the inefficiently low labor supply present due to monopolistic competition. While
average taxes are sensitive to changes in the competitive environment, inflation and nominal
interest rates remain almost unaffected. In particular, optimal inflation rates are negative
and close to zero, thus striking a balance between the distortions of positive nominal interest
rates and the resource cost of price adjustments.12 This policy is feasible because the sequential
planner accumulates a larger net asset position against the private sector if monopoly distortions
call for higher labor subsidies. Indeed, when monopolistic markups increase from 10% over
20% to 30%, the debt-to-GDP ratio in the Markovian steady state changes from −5.99 over
−8.02 to −9.72. Higher interest earnings on the government’s net assets then finance the
increased subsidy without the need to resort to additional revenues from the inflation tax. This
mechanism again highlights the importance of keeping track of the variation in the endogenous
state variables when discussing the implications of changes in the economic environment on
optimal monetary and fiscal policies.
4.4.4 Variations in elasticities of substitution
Finally, we investigate whether the preference parameters ϑ and η affect the dynamic properties
of Markov-perfect equilibrium policies. Table 5 summarizes simulated time series statistics for
several different values of ϑ−1, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and
η−1, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. A first observation is that changes in these elasticities
have only relatively small effects on the average levels of tax and inflation rates. In contrast,
they have a strong influence on the steady state generated by these policies. The intuition for
this is as follows. A high ϑ implies a low consumption elasticity. This means that the cost of
reduced consumption as a consequence of distortionary policies is relatively high such that the
policy maker accumulates more assets in order to minimize these distortions. Similarly, a high
η implies a low elasticity of labor supply. Hence, the distortions in terms of lost output due
to the taxation of the returns from labor (via the wage tax or the inflation tax) are relatively
low, and there is less need to accumulate a large net asset position.13 These considerations are
reflected in the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocations summarized in Table 5. As predicted,
we find that, in absolute terms, the government’s real net asset position increases with ϑ and
12In addition, we find that the volatility of taxes and interest rates is increasing in the markup, whereas the
volatility of inflation does hardly change.
13See Martin (2007) for a further discussion of these aspects of Markov-perfect equilibria in the context of a
flexible price economy with nominal government debt.
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Table 4: Effects of market power on the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation
Variable Mean Std. dev. Auto. Corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,a)
Low markup (θ = 11)
τ -9.7271 2.4353 0.4982 0.5999 0.1632 0.8378
pi -0.2296 0.1119 0.4818 -0.5665 -0.1876 -0.8110
R 3.7484 0.4110 0.6203 -0.4102 0.3535 -0.1416
y 0.2839 0.0064 0.9202 1.0000 0.1559 0.9116
h 0.2836 0.0052 0.5593 -0.5936 0.1961 -0.8693
c 0.2436 0.0065 0.9024 0.9238 -0.2097 0.8995
b -1.6997 0.0349 0.9326 -0.9895 -0.2783 -0.8628
m 0.0770 0.0030 0.8790 0.8118 -0.2989 0.6737
` -1.6227 0.0327 0.9271 -0.9821 -0.3254 -0.8598
High markup (θ = 13/3)
τ -30.2323 3.0268 0.4381 0.4476 0.0915 0.8202
pi -0.1925 0.1203 0.4214 -0.4178 -0.1058 -0.7986
R 3.7932 0.5820 0.3919 -0.2431 0.2015 0.2013
y 0.2846 0.0063 0.9370 1.0000 0.1986 0.8487
h 0.2843 0.0060 0.5014 -0.4338 0.2132 -0.8408
c 0.2443 0.0063 0.9228 0.9199 -0.1759 0.8479
b -2.7662 0.0595 0.9189 -0.9891 -0.1784 -0.9142
m 0.0771 0.0031 0.7279 0.7194 -0.2286 0.4060
` -2.6891 0.0575 0.9102 -0.9833 -0.1972 -0.9234
The parameters are: β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9, κ = 17.5/4, ρa = 0.82, a¯ = 1,
σa = 0.0229, ρg = 0.9, g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302, A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524,
J = 500, T = 100.
decreases with η. Note, however, that the relevant implications are reversed when expressed in
terms of debt-to-GDP ratios. The reason for this is that the changed elasticities also impinge
on labor supply and output at the steady state.
5 Concluding remarks
In environments with imperfect competition and nominal debt, fiscal and monetary policy is
typically subject to the well-known time-consistency problem. The Ramsey approach to optimal
policy circumvents this problem by assuming that policy makers have access to a commitment
technology. In this framework, several interesting properties of optimal fiscal and monetary
policy have been established. For example, it has been shown that the optimal policy in
environments with nominal rigidities implements stable prices.
In this paper, we have investigated optimal fiscal and monetary policies presuming that there
is no commitment technology available to the policy maker. We have analyzed time-consistent
optimal policies (in the sense of Markov-perfect equilibria) in environments of both flexible
and sticky prices. Our first central finding is that, if prices are flexible, the Friedman rule is
optimal irrespective of the degree of monopolistic competition. The intuition behind this result
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Table 5: Effects of elasticities on the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation
Variable Mean Std. dev. Auto. Corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,a)
ϑ = 1.5
τ -19.0705 3.1559 0.4992 0.5726 0.0850 0.8452
pi -0.3085 0.1294 0.4800 -0.5338 -0.1041 -0.8168
R 3.6671 0.4426 0.5954 -0.3728 0.2198 -0.0431
y 0.3898 0.0069 0.9272 1.0000 0.1831 0.8981
h 0.3894 0.0087 0.6205 -0.6951 0.1477 -0.9388
c 0.3494 0.0068 0.9213 0.9323 -0.1604 0.8980
b -2.6617 0.0611 0.9335 -0.9981 -0.1388 -0.8921
m 0.1108 0.0036 0.8609 0.7651 -0.2197 0.5533
` -2.5509 0.0582 0.9278 -0.9995 -0.1596 -0.9016
ϑ = 0.5
τ -21.0050 2.4625 0.3709 0.3164 0.1691 0.7725
pi -0.0613 0.0712 0.3580 -0.2948 -0.1832 -0.7531
R 3.9308 0.7960 0.2813 -0.2016 0.2873 0.2762
y 0.1296 0.0045 0.9208 1.0000 0.2815 0.7750
h 0.1295 0.0030 0.4317 0.2456 0.4295 -0.4080
c 0.0895 0.0044 0.8709 0.8442 -0.2456 0.7822
b -1.6336 0.0358 0.9058 -0.9537 -0.3604 -0.8788
m 0.0281 0.0019 0.6613 0.7034 -0.3122 0.4276
` -1.6055 0.0348 0.8953 -0.9393 -0.3878 -0.8782
η = 1.5
τ -20.2859 3.4119 0.5197 0.2750 0.0997 0.7470
pi -0.1704 0.1257 0.5143 -0.2276 -0.1109 -0.7112
R 3.7396 0.6053 0.5835 -0.4135 0.2225 0.0788
y 0.2585 0.0061 0.9291 1.0000 0.1834 0.8143
h 0.2583 0.0057 0.5660 -0.3000 0.2025 -0.7934
c 0.2183 0.0061 0.9135 0.9160 -0.2028 0.8059
b -2.1649 0.0490 0.9190 -0.9979 -0.1950 -0.8379
m 0.0691 0.0033 0.8302 0.7719 -0.2327 0.4204
` -2.0958 0.0465 0.9129 -0.9944 -0.2218 -0.8517
η = 0.5
τ -20.0754 2.4805 0.4621 0.4993 0.1194 0.8284
pi -0.2424 0.1279 0.4431 -0.4628 -0.1379 -0.8014
R 3.7403 0.5010 0.4545 -0.2839 0.2423 0.1170
y 0.3214 0.0071 0.9360 1.0000 0.1745 0.8705
h 0.3210 0.0065 0.5198 -0.4890 0.1953 -0.8516
c 0.2810 0.0071 0.9215 0.9369 -0.1573 0.8694
b -2.4440 0.0514 0.9256 -0.9956 -0.2226 -0.8928
m 0.0888 0.0034 0.7925 0.7647 -0.2335 0.4976
` -2.3551 0.0490 0.9171 -0.9897 -0.2500 -0.9010
Unless indicated otherwise, the parameters are: β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9,
θ = 6, κ = 17.5/4, ρa = 0.82, a¯ = 1, σa = 0.0229, ρg = 0.9, g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302,
A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524, J = 500, T = 100.
is that, over time, the sequential government accumulates enough assets to do away with the
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distortions introduced by monopolistic competition. In particular, the government subsidizes
labor effort to equate real wages to the marginal product of labor.
Under sticky prices, we find that the optimal volatilities of taxes and inflation are similar to
the corresponding volatilities in the Ramsey equilibrium. Independently of the government’s
net asset position, the existence of resource costs due to non-zero and volatile inflation induces
optimal policy to focus on price stability. The cyclical properties of optimal policies are robust
to changes in the degree of market power as well as to changes in the household’s preferences.
One important difference between the solution to the Ramsey problem and the Markov perfect
equilibrium allocation under sticky prices, however, concerns the dynamic behavior of taxes and
real debt. In the Ramsey equilibrium, taxes and debt follow a near-random walk in response to
an expenditure shock. In the Markov-perfect equilibrium, the dynamics of these two variables
strike a balance between the persistence resulting from the low variability in the price level on
the one hand, and the smooth convergence to the unique steady state on the other hand.
The key mechanism behind our results is the endogenous selection of a locally unique and
asymptotically stable steady state in the Markov-perfect equilibrium. The sequential policy
maker dynamically manipulates the economy’s endogenous state variable such as to affect the
incentive constraints faced by its future incarnations. This implies that the steady state is
such that the time-consistency problem of the government becomes vacuous. In our particular
context, the government accumulates sufficient claims against the private sector to cover its
exogenous spending requirements without the need to resort to distortionary taxation. Indeed,
the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation involves a significant positive
net asset position for the government. This counterfactual property of the Markov-perfect
equilibrium allocation may be viewed as a shortcoming of the present analysis. An interesting
next step in this research programme would therefore be to introduce politico-economic frictions
that typically lead to excessive fiscal deficits. In this way, we could perhaps move towards a
positive theory of fiscal and monetary policy under the assumption of no commitment.
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Appendix
A Dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation at the
Markovian steady state
Table 6 below displays the dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation evaluated at the steady
state obtained in the Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Table 6: Dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation around the Markovian steady state
Variable Mean Std. dev. Auto. Corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,a)
Flexible prices (κ = 0)
τ -20 0 - - - -
pi -3.8426 2.1877 -0.0921 -0.3087 -0.0235 -0.3126
R 0 0 - - - -
y 0.2866 0.0095 0.7672 1.0000 0.0959 0.9953
h 0.2861 0.0014 0.4578 -0.7049 0.6305 -0.7696
c 0.2464 0.0095 0.7738 0.9913 -0.0318 0.9992
b -2.2889 0.0811 0.7737 -0.9909 0.0345 -0.9991
m 0.0946 0.0036 0.7738 0.9913 -0.0318 0.9992
` -2.1943 0.0771 0.7734 -0.9909 0.0347 -0.9991
Sticky prices (κ = 17.5/4)
τ -19.9392 2.0997 0.5335 0.5322 0.1100 0.7552
pi -0.2884 0.0785 0.3735 -0.5207 -0.1235 -0.6712
R 3.6873 0.4645 0.7028 -0.5952 0.1775 -0.4980
y 0.2842 0.0074 0.8936 1.0000 0.1818 0.9297
h 0.2839 0.0045 0.5770 -0.5326 0.3030 -0.8001
c 0.2439 0.0073 0.8883 0.9424 -0.1358 0.9366
b -2.2675 0.0810 0.9818 -0.5507 -0.0859 -0.3659
m 0.0772 0.0035 0.9030 0.8773 -0.1658 0.8310
` -2.1904 0.0795 0.9825 -0.5179 -0.0958 -0.3339
Parameters: β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9, θ = 6, ρa = 0.82, a¯ = 1, σa = 0.0229,
ρg = 0.9, g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302, A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524, J = 500, T = 100.
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Supplementary Appendices
B Derivation of the household’s first-order conditions
This Supplementary Appendix derives the household’s optimality conditions stated in subsec-
tion 3.1. Note first that the household’s problem is formally given by
V (sit, st, zt; Ω) = max
mit, b
i
t, c
i
t, h
i
t, h˜
i
t, p
i
t
{
u(cit, h
i
t) + βEtV (s
i
t+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
}
+λit
[
`t−1
pit
+ (1− τt)wthit + (pit)1−θyt − wth˜it −
κ
2
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)2
− cit[1 + s(vit)]−mit −
bit
1 +Rt
]
+mctλ
i
t
[
ath˜
i
t −
(
pit
)−θ
yt
]
,
where λit andmctλ
i
t denote the Lagrangian multipliers on the household’s budget and production
constraints, respectively. Differentiating the above expression with respect to the decision
variables yields the following set of first-order conditions:
0 = βEt
∂V (sit+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
∂mit
− λit[1− (vit)2s′(vit)],
0 = βEt
∂V (sit+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
∂bit
− λit
1
1 +Rt
,
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂cit
− λit[1 + s(vit) + vts′(vit)],
0 =
∂u(cit, h
i
t)
∂hit
+ λit(1− τt)wt,
0 = −λitwt +mctλitat,
0 = βEt
∂V (sit+1, st+1, zt+1; Ω)
∂pit
+ λit(1− θ)(pit)−θyt − λtκ
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)
pit
pit−1
+mctλ
i
tθ(p
i
t)
−θ−1yt.
Furthermore, from the envelope theorem we get
∂V (sit, st, zt; Ω)
∂mit−1
=
∂V (sit, st, zt; Ω)
∂bit−1
=
∂V (sit, st, zt; Ω)
∂`it−1
=
λit
pit
,
∂V (sit, st, zt; Ω)
∂pit−1
= −λitκ
(
pitpit
pit−1
− 1
)(
− p
i
tpit
(pit−1)2
)
.
Combining envelope and first-order conditions, we obtain the system of equations stated in
subsection 3.1.
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C Private sector equilibrium conditions
In the following we list the private sector equilibrium conditions. We require that households
are representative. This implies pit = 1 for all t and all i, and we can drop the index i in our
further analysis. Let the utility function be given by (13) and the transaction cost function
by (14). Recall that, since policies are required to be feasible, we can replace the household’s
budget constraint by an aggregate resource constraint and the policy feasibility constraint. The
conditions associated with the household’s problem are thus given by:
0 = c−ϑt − λt[1 + 2Avt − 2
√
AB],
0 = −δh(1− ht)−η + λt(1− τt)wt,
0 = Av2t −B −
(
1− 1
1 +Rt
)
,
0 = βEt
λt+1
pit+1
− λt
1 +Rt
,
0 = λtpit(pit − 1)− βEtλt+1(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 − λtθatht
κ
(
wt
at
+
1− θ
θ
)
,
0 = atht − ct[1 + Avt +B 1
vt
− 2
√
AB]− gt − κ
2
(pit − 1)2,
0 = τtwtht +mt + bt/(1 +Rt)− `t−1
pit
− gt,
0 = vt − ct
mt
,
0 = `t −mt − bt.
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D The sequential planner’s problem in primal form
Let xt+1 = (`t, at+1, gt+1). Using a primal approach and the results from Supplementary Ap-
pendix C, the maximization problem of a benevolent single government without commitment
power then reads as follows:
V˜ (`t−1, at, gt)
= max
ct, ht, `t,mt, bt, pit, wt, τt, Rt, λt, vt
{
c1−ϑt − 1
1− ϑ + δh
(1− ht)1−η − 1
1− η + βEtV˜ (`t, at+1, gt+1)
}
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(
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)
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where χ1t -χ
9
t denote the multipliers on the respective implementability constraints. The first-
order conditions resulting from this optimization problem are given by
0 = c−ϑt − ϑχ1t c−ϑ−1t − χ6t
(
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1
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)
− χ8t
1
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,
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,
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Finally, the envelope condition is
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.
Using the envelope condition allows us, after some algebraic manipulations, to rewrite the first-
order conditions from above in the following way. This system of equations fully characterize
the policy maker’s optimal decision rules.
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E Numerical Strategy
The numerical approach we employ to solve for Markov-perfect equilibrium policies proceeds
in two steps. In the first step, the non-stochastic steady state of the model is (approximately)
computed based on a first-order accurate perturbation method. This allows us to determine the
relevant state space, which facilitates the implementation of global solution methods. Finally,
we use Galerkin projection methods to compute a third-order accurate solution of the policy
maker’s problem.14
Before going into details, let us first introduce some more notation. In particular, let ελ = ∂λ(x
∗)
∂l
and εpi = ∂pi(x∗)
∂l
denote the derivatives of the respective decision rules evaluated at the steady
state.
To compute the (approximate) steady state, we employ an iterative procedure based on lin-
earization methods. We proceed as follows:15
1.1 We guess initial values for the derivatives at the steady state. In particular, we set these
(initial) derivatives to ελ0 = 0 and ε
λ
0 = 0.
1.2 Given ελ0 and ε
λ
0 , we solve the non-linear system of equations stated in Supplementary
Appendix F for the implied steady state x∗.
1.3 Given the steady state x∗, we compute a first-order perturbation solution. We use the
decision rules for λ and pi to obtain new values for the derivatives, which we denote by
ελ1 and ε
pi
1 .
1.4 We compute ς = |ελ1 − ελ0 | + |εpi1 − εpi0 |. If ς is sufficiently small (i.e., smaller than 10−6),
we stop. Else we set ελ0 = ε
λ
1 , ε
pi
0 = ε
pi
1 and return to Step 1.2.
Having obtained the (approximate) steady state, we solve the model globally using projection
methods. In particular, we follow the monomial Galerkin approach illustrated in Pichler (2007).
For models with several state variables, this method is roughly equivalent to the traditional
projection approach pioneered by Judd (1992) in terms of accuracy, but achieves convergence
faster. Again, we proceed in several steps.
2.1 We decide upon the set of policies that are approximated with parametric forms. In the
present application, we find it convenient to choose the decision rules for i, τ , λ, pi, and
the multiplier χ7, respectively.
2.2 We postulate flexible functional forms. To be precise, we approximate each decision rule
with a linear combination of Chebyshev polynomials, which are defined recursively as
T0(y) = 1, T1(y) = y, Tj(y) = 2yTj−1(y)− Tj−2(y), j = 2, 3, ...
14Our MATLAB computer code is available upon request.
15We do not formally establish convergence of this iterative procedure. However, in all our numerical examples,
the algorithm did converge without posing any challanges.
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We use a complete basis of polynomials up to order p = 3, such that our approximations
take the following form:
iˆ(`, a, g; νi) =
p∑
j1=0
p−j2∑
j2=0
p−j1−j2∑
j3=0
νij1,j2,j3Tj1,j2,j3(x),
τˆ(`, a, g; ντ ) =
p∑
j1=0
p−j2∑
j2=0
p−j1−j2∑
j3=0
ντj1,j2,j3Tj1,j2,j3(x),
λˆ(`, a, g; νλ) =
p∑
j1=0
p−j2∑
j2=0
p−j1−j2∑
j3=0
νλj1,j2,j3Tj1,j2,j3(x),
pˆi(`, a, g; νpi) =
p∑
j1=0
p−j2∑
j2=0
p−j1−j2∑
j3=0
νpij1,j2,j3Tj1,j2,j3(x),
χˆ7(`, a, g; νχ) =
p∑
j1=0
p−j2∑
j2=0
p−j1−j2∑
j3=0
νχj1,j2,j3Tj1,j2,j3(x).
Here, νk collects the coefficients associated with decision rule k, and Tj1,j2,j3(x) is the
multivariate Chebyshev polynomial, i.e.,
Tj1,j2,j3(x) = Tj1(ξ`(`))Tj2(ξa(a))Tj3(ξg(g)).
In the above expression, ξxj maps the state space for variable xj into [−1, 1], i.e., ξxj =
2(xj−xj)/(x¯j−xj)−1. The application of this linear transformation requires to postulate
some upper and lower bounds on each state variable. To facilitate convergence of our
algorithm to a solution, these bounds must be chosen such that they cover the steady
state. If this steady state vector was unknown, we would have to select the bounds
following a trial-and-error strategy.16 In our setting, however, the approximate steady
state is known from the iterative procedure 1.1-1.4. Consequently, we can simply set xj
and x¯j such that our relevant state space is a symmetric interval around the steady state.
The precise size of the interval is chosen such that the economy stays within the bounds
during the simulations.
2.3 We choose the projection conditions. Since we employ a Galerkin method, these condi-
tions are given by∫
[−1,1]3
R(x; ν)Tj1,j2,j3(x) = 0, j1, j2, j3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, j1 + j2 + j3 ≤ p,
where R summarizes the equilibrium conditions and ν = (νi, ..., νχ). We use monomial
rules as suggested in Pichler (2007) to evaluate the above integrals. This gives us a system
of nonlinear equations which can be solved for the unknown coefficients ν.
The quality of numerical solutions can be assessed using standard measures of numerical ac-
curacy. In particular, we investigate the Euler equation errors as suggested by Judd (1992).
16See, e.g., Ortigueira (2006).
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The average and maximum error measures resulting from our simulations are summarized in
Table 7. We find that our numerical solutions are sufficiently accurate, with average errors
never exceeding 0.03% and the maximum errors below 0.5% for all model variants considered.
Table 7: Accuracy measures
Case Average error Maximum error
Benchmark -4.0 -3.4
κ = 0, θ =∞ -4.9 -4.2
κ = 0 -5.1 -4.5
θ = 11 -4.1 -3.4
θ = 13/3 -4.3 -3.9
ϑ = 1.5 -4.1 -3.6
ϑ = 0.5 -4.1 -3.1
η = 1.5 -3.5 -2.3
η = 0.5 -4.3 -3.9
Note: Error measures are in base 10 logarithms;
unless indicated otherwise, the parameters are:
β = 1/1.04, ϑ = 1, η = 1, δh = 2.9, κ = 17.5/4,
θ = 6, ρa = 0.82, a¯ = 1, σa = 0.0229, ρg = 0.9,
g¯ = 0.04, σg = 0.0302, A = 0.0111, B = 0.07524,
J = 500, T = 100.
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F Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Imposing steady state on the system of optimality conditions listed at the end of
Supplementary Appendix D and the two exogenous laws of motion (1) and (4) yields the
following system of non-linear equations.
0 = c−ϑ − ϑχ1c−ϑ−1 − χ6
(
1 + Av +B
1
v
− 2
√
AB
)
− χ8 1
m
,
0 = −δh(1− h)−η − χ2ηδh(1− h)−η−1 − χ5λθa
(
w
a
+
1− θ
θ
)
+ χ6a+ χ7τw,
0 = −βχ
7
pi
+ χ4β
∂[λ(x)/pi(x)]
∂`
− χ5κβ∂{λ(x)[pi(x)− 1]pi(x)}
∂`
+
χ7
1 +R
,
0 = χ7
R
1 +R
+ χ8
c
m2
,
0 = χ5κλ(2pi − 1)− χ6κ(pi − 1) + χ7 `
pi2
,
0 = χ7 − χ5λθ,
0 = −χ2λ+ χ7h,
0 = −χ3 + χ4λ− χ7b,
0 = −χ1
(
1 + 2Av − 2
√
AB
)
+ χ2(1− τ)w − χ
4
1 +R
+ χ5
[
κpi(pi − 1)− θah
(
w
a
+
1− θ
θ
)]
,
0 = −2Aχ1λ+ 2Aχ3v − χ6c[A− B
v2
] + χ8,
0 = c−ϑ − λ
(
1 + 2Av − 2
√
AB
)
,
0 = −δh(1− h)−η + λ(1− τ)w,
0 = Av2 −B − R
1 +R
,
0 = β
λ
pi
− λ
1 +R
,
0 = κλpi(pi − 1)− κβλ(pi − 1)pi − λθah
(
w
a
+
1− θ
θ
)
,
0 = ah− c
(
1 + Av +B
1
v
− 2
√
AB
)
− g − κ
2
(pi − 1)2,
0 = τwh+m+ b/(1 +R)− `
pi
− g,
0 = v − c
m
,
0 = `−m− b,
0 = (1− ρa) log a¯+ ρa log a− log a,
0 = (1− ρg) log g¯ + ρg log g − log g.
Presuming that κ = 0, it is easy to show that the allocation given in Proposition 1 satisfies this
system of equilibrium conditions. 
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